The emerging agreement between Iran and the United States has not yet been signed, but the chances are growing that the ceasefire already signed signals the end of the current confrontation between Washington and Tehran. In any event, it reflects the Trump administration鈥檚 deep desire to avoid a return to high-intensity fighting with Iran. And, as is often the case with partial or temporary agreements, what begins as provisional can gradually become permanent. For Israel, this is a bad agreement, but not a reason for paralysis. It is a warning that Israel must quickly define what can still be salvaged.

There is no easy way to say this: the emerging agreement is bad for Israel 鈥� potentially very bad. In the near term, billions of dollars are expected to flow to Iran, providing a significant injection of energy into the regime鈥檚 stability and its ability to sponsor terrorism across the Middle East. The broader strategic objective of weakening the regime and increasing pressure on its survivalis expected to suffer a serious blow, precisely at a moment when the regime鈥檚 stability is at a low point. Moreover, the agreement is likely to strengthen those in Iran who claim that the Islamic Republic has won 鈥� that it stood firm against 鈥渁ggression,鈥� demonstrated its regional standing, and managed to alter the status quo in the Strait of Hormuz in its favor.

On the nuclear front, it appears that the parties have agreed, for now, to defer the most urgent and serious issue: the fact that Iran still possesses a stockpile of roughly half a ton of uranium enriched to 60 percent. Removing that highly enriched uranium from Iranian soil, or diluting it, is a necessary condition for reducing this strategic threat. Now, the United States is expected to sign a ceasefire agreement without that condition being met, without clear inspection mechanisms or a credible military threat, and at a time when, on the other side, stands a regime whose motivation to acquire a nuclear bomb is at an all-time high 鈥� one of the central lessons it has drawn from the recent confrontations. It is also worth saying clearly: it would be dangerousto assume that Iran鈥檚 covert attempts to smuggle enriched uranium to a secret facility in the desert could be monitored hermetically.

On the missile issue, it appears that the United States has abandoned its demands entirely, leaving Israel and the countries of the region under a strategic threat that is expected to worsen in the coming years as long as the regime remains in place. Past experience shows that Iran鈥檚 force-buildup efforts cannot be dramatically constrained. It is reasonable to assume that Tehran will work energetically to reach its goal of 10,000 ballistic missiles within just a few years 鈥� with at least some of them potentially capable of reaching America, and certainly Europe.

The overall balance for Israel is negative. Based on Iran鈥檚 past behavior, there is every reason to believe that Tehran will channel the money it receives to Hezbollah long before it transfers it to its own citizens. The IDF鈥檚 impressive operational achievements in southern Lebanon will not translate into strategic gains without draining the Iranian swamp. That, unfortunately, has become a harder mission than it was only a few months ago, because of Iran鈥檚 growing confidence in its ability to restrict Israel鈥檚 use of force in Lebanon. As a result, Israel鈥檚 freedom of action in Lebanon is now more constrained than at any point since October 7, 2023.

The agreement is also expected to expose the fundamental gap between Israel and the United States on the Iranian question, in a way that will give momentum to Israel鈥檚 adversaries and critics. In many respects, Israel is perceived as being in a state of strategic weakness: heavily dependent on the Trump administration, while at the same time locked in a fundamental disagreement with it over the way forward on Iran.

And yet, there is still much that can be done. Israel should focus its efforts on the art of the possible, first and foremost, to ensure an effective and clear solution for the enriched uranium that remains in Iran, along with clear inspection mechanisms for that process. This should be Israel鈥檚 immediate diplomatic priority.

The agreement signed on June 26 between Israel and Lebanon is a step in the right direction, which demonstrates the existence of a zone of possible agreement (ZOPA) with Beirut. The window of opportunity to exploit Hezbollah鈥檚 strategic isolation remains open, as the organization faces growing domestic criticism and a hostile president in Syria. Israel and the United States can and should formulate a strategy designed to dry up both the Iranians and the money, the two things that keep Hezbollah alive in Lebanon. In parallel, Israel should press the United States to demand that the Lebanese state meet measurable targets for disarming Hezbollah and, if there is no alternative, preserve Israel鈥檚 ability to operate militarily throughout Lebanon if all other options fail.

The agreement also requires Israel to reorganize around the objectives the United States has deprioritized, foremost among them the future of the Iranian regime and the missile threat. A renewed strategy could include a coalition of regional states, many of which see eye to eye with Israel on the Iranian threat. Meanwhile, the IDF must carefully plan for the growing likelihood of direct rounds of fighting with Iran, so that, if they are forced upon Israel, they serve Israel鈥檚 broader strategic objectives.

The signing of the agreement would place Israel in a strategic reality worse than the one it faced before the last campaign. Yet Israel still has the ability to make lemonade from this sour lemon. If Israel can help ensure that the enriched uranium leaves Iran, and if it can use this moment to push Iran and its money out of Lebanon, then a damaging agreement can still be turned into a strategic opening. Israel鈥檚 position would improve significantly, as would its ability to confront the other challenges posed by the emerging agreement.

The Trump administration has rolled its dice. Israel now has to make its own move.

Or Horvitz is a senior fellow at JPPI. A former Lieutenant Colonel in Israeli Defense Intelligence (IDI) and served as Head of the Hezbollah and Lebanon Branch (2022鈥�2024) and later as Senior Advisor to the Director of IDI (2024鈥�2026), where he was centrally involved in post鈥揙ctober 7 transformation processes and Israel鈥檚 campaigns against Hezbollah and Iran.